W ork is currently under way on the preparation of DSM-5, which is due in May 2013. From the outset of the DSM-5 revision process in 1999, its developers were hopeful that the changes would be so significant so as to constitute a paradigm shift in psychiatric diagnosis. 1 Given current dissatisfaction with the limitations of the DSM-IV descriptive categorical paradigm, it is certainly understandable why such changes would be desired. But has our understanding of the underlying etiology and pathophysiology of psychiatric illnesses progressed far enough to justify such a paradigm shift?
My paper begins with a historical review of prior editions of the DSM, which have alternated between paradigm shifts (the original DSM in 1952 and DSM-III in 1980) and incremental improvements (DSM-II in 1968, DSM-III-R in 1987, and DSM-IV in 1994). It then presents the various limitations of the current paradigm and describes the effort undertaken in advance of the formal DSM-5 development process to conduct a state-of-the-science review and develop a research agenda to prepare the way for a future paradigm shift. However, the results of this review suggest that despite the scientific advances since DSM-III was introduced in 1980, we still do not have a sufficiently deep understanding of the pathophysiology of mental disorders to justify abandoning the descriptive approach in favour of a more etiologically based alternative. My paper continues with a brief description of the DSM-5 development process and then presents potential hurdles to incorporating dimensional measures into DSM-5. It concludes with suggestions for how DSM might facilitate a future paradigm shift.
Historical Background
There have been 2 prior paradigm shifts associated with the DSM: the introduction of the first edition of the DSM in 1952 and DSM-III in 1980. Both of these shifts were a consequence of profound changes in American psychiatry that were happening coincident with their development. World War II had an enormous impact on the practice of psychiatry in the United States, shifting its interest away from treating patients with severe psychoses residing in public mental hospitals to treating milder conditions in the hope that early treatment would prevent the later development of more serious mental illnesses. 2 Indeed, by 1956, only about 17% of the roughly 10 000 members of the APA worked in hospital settings, compared with more than two-thirds in 1940. 2 Consequently, psychodynamic and psychosocial models, which considered mental illness to be the consequence of a mixture of a noxious environment and intrapsychic conflict, became dominant in the postwar years, replacing the Kraepelinian model used in asylum settings. 3 Further, psychiatrists working in the military during World War II found existing nomenclatures ill-adapted to 90% of their patients, leading the Army and the Navy to adopt their own classifications, 2 which greatly expanded the neurotic syndromes based on the principles of psychodynamics. These classifications formed the foundation for the original DSM, which, in addition to incorporating psychoanalytic concepts into its definitions of psychoneuroses, conceptualized all functional psychiatric disorders as reactions, reflecting prevailing psychosocial theories that psychological conflict and environmental factors collide to produce psychopathology. Little effort was made to provide precise disorder definitions because it was felt that overt symptoms did not reveal disease entities but instead disguised underlying conflicts that could not be expressed directly. 3 DSM-II, published in 1968, essentially retained the overall approach adopted by the first edition of the DSM but made numerous changes in terminology to make it compatible with ICD-8.
With the publication of DSM-III in 1980, psychiatric nosology underwent a radical shift, reflecting the significant changes that psychiatry as a field was undergoing in the 1960s and 1970s. Psychiatric diagnosis had been criticized for its lack of diagnostic reliability-diagnostic agreement among 2 psychiatrists evaluating the same patient was little more than random chance. 4 The successful introduction of psychotropic medications such as lithium carbonate, tricyclic antidepressants, and first-generation antipsychotics created a need for methodologically sound research programs for the development and evaluation of new treatments. Essential to such research was the availability of operationalized diagnostic criteria that could be used to define discrete syndromes that might be a target for pharmacological treatment. Further, growing discontent within the profession with the psychosocial and psychodymanic models of psychopathology, 3 coupled with attacks on the legitimacy of psychiatry by critics such as Thomas Szasz, 5 who claimed that mental illness is a myth, promoted the embracing of a diagnostic model from medicine where diagnosis is the keystone of medical practice and clinical research. 6 This symptom-based approach equated visible and measurable symptoms with the presence of disease and allowed researchers to reliably assess symptoms and to legitimize clinicians' claims to be treating real diseases that deserve reimbursement from third party insurers. 7 The paradigm shift introduced by DSM-III thus entailed adopting a descriptive symptom-based approach that was essentially theory-neutral regarding underlying etiology. As noted by Klerman, 8 this reliance on descriptive rather than etiologic criteria does not represent an abandonment of the ideal of modern scientific medicine that classification and diagnosis should be by causation [but] rather . . . a strategic mode for dealing with the frustrating reality that for most of the disorders we currently treat there is only limited evidence for their etiologies. p 540
The hope from the outset was that the operationalized definitions introduced by DSM-III would enable psychiatric researchers to make great strides toward understanding the underlying causes of mental disorders, with the eventual result that the descriptive approach would be replaced by a diagnostic system based on objective laboratory findings, as was the case with the rest of medicine. With the goal of identifying homogeneous subgroups of patients who presumably shared a common underlying etiology, DSM-III established numerous diagnostic subtypes (for example, melancholic depression) and also strived to split broad diagnostic groupings into narrowly defined categories that shared specific diagnostic features. This strategy resulted in a large expansion of the number of categories (compared with DSM-II) and consequent high rates of diagnostic comorbidity.
Although the DSM-III criteria sets had undergone extensive field testing, numerous problems were identified once they were widely adopted. 9 In many instances the wording of criteria sets was unclear and inconsistent across categories. Further, data from studies published shortly after the publication of DSM-III were inconsistent with some of the diagnostic criteria. For example, evidence suggested that the DSM-III diagnostic hierarchy, which placed MDD above panic disorder, was incorrect. 10 Thus committees of experts were appointed to review the DSM-III criteria for consistency, clarity, and conceptual accuracy and 3 national field trials were conducted to help in the development of diagnostic criteria for selected disorders such as attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, autistic disorder, and GAD. Although the final document, DSM-III-R, had numerous small changes, it remained completely faithful to the DSM-III paradigm of employing descriptive operational criteria for defining categorical disorders.
Work on the development of DSM-IV began shortly after the release of DSM-III-R and was spurred on primarily by the expected publication of ICD-10 in 1993. Because clinicians (including mental health professionals) in the United States are obliged to use ICD diagnostic codes for data collection and billing purposes, it was important that the development of the DSM-IV and ICD-10 be coordinated and that the groups developing DSM-IV and ICD-10 had an opportunity for mutual influence. 11 Although the volume of empirical data available to the developers of DSM-IV far exceeded that available to the DSM-III and DSM-III-R workgroups, it was immediately evident that limited advances in psychiatry's understanding of the underlying causes of psychiatric illness did not justify making major changes to the structure and nature of the nosology. Instead, the major innovation in the DSM-IV development process was its emphasis on explicit documentation and review of evidence. 12 Indeed, many aspects of the DSM-IV development process were specifically intended to address previously identified problems in the development of DSM-III and DSM-III-R. For example, in response to criticisms that DSM-III and DSM-III-R decisions were "more consistent with the opinions, findings, and publication of the committee members than with the wider literature," 12, p 282 the DSM-IV revision required a comprehensive review of empirical evidence to support any proposed changes. This consisted of 3 phases: systematic literature reviews, secondary data reanalyses, and focused field trials. 11, 13 Elaborate precautions were taken to insure that the evaluation of empirical evidence would be fair and balanced, with the goal to "reach the conclusions a person with no fixed preconceptions (a consensus scholar) would discover from a comprehensive overview of the entire research literature." 11, p 374 Specific guidelines were provided on the conduct of literature searches and presentation of results. 14 Each review was subject to critique by not only workgroup members but also a large group of advisers to identify "inaccuracies, gaps in coverage, and biased interpretations of the research." 12, p 283 To guard against bias, people likely to be critical of the recommendations were included among the advisers. 14 Mindful of the disruption to research and clinical practice that inevitably results from making changes to the nosology, the developers of DSM-IV adopted a conservative approach. From the outset, the threshold for making changes was set much higher than it was for DSM-III and DSM-III-R. 11 Workgroups were directed to make changes only if they were compelling and substantiated by the systematic review of empirical data. New diagnoses would be included not to stimulate research but only after their validity and utility were well established. 15 By and large, the DSM-IV workgroups were most concerned about false negatives and tended to make recommendations that made it easier for a diagnosis to be made by lowering diagnostic thresholds. Conversely, the DSM-IV Task Force functioned as a conservative counterpoint to the workgroups by enforcing the discipline of maintaining a high threshold for making changes based on solid empirical evidence. 16 DSM-IV was published in 1994 along with a 4-volume Sourcebook 17-20 that provided comprehensive documentation of the empirical basis for the changes.
Dissatisfaction With the DSM-IV Paradigm
DSM-III and its successors have been embraced by both the research and the clinical communities 21 because they established a common diagnostic language that facilitated communication and improved diagnostic reliability by employing rule-based explicit diagnostic criteria. 22 However, in recent years, both researchers [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] and clinicians 31 have expressed great frustration with the descriptive categorical approach taken by DSM-IV and ICD-10. Disorders in the DSM and ICD are defined in terms of syndromes; that is, symptoms that have been observed to co-vary together in people. In adopting this approach, DSM-III presumed that, as in general medicine, the phenomenon of symptom covariation could be explained by a common underlying etiology and pathophysiology. Although based largely on expert consensus, there was a general understanding that the DSM-III criteria would be continually revised in subsequent editions based on new research findings, ultimately culminating in the identification of the underlying disease processes. Unfortunately, in the 30 years since the publication of DSM-III, this goal has remained elusive. Despite the discovery of many promising candidates, not one single laboratory marker has been shown to be diagnostically useful for making any DSM diagnosis. 32 35 has also been problematic. Treatments from widely different drug classes are effective for the same diagnosis (for example, lithium, anticonvulsants, and antipsychotics for treatment of acute mania) and the same drug can be effective for treating disorders across the diagnostic spectrum (for example, selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors are effective for depression, panic, GAD, posttraumatic stress disorder, social anxiety, body dysmorphic disorder, OCD, pathological gambling, trichotillomania, borderline PD, and premenstrual dysphoric disorder). Twin studies have also contradicted many of DSM's assumptions that separate syndromes have a distinct underlying genetic basis (for example, MDD and GAD have identical genetic risk factors 36 ). Diagnostic heterogeneity is the rule for most DSM-IV diagnostic categories. For example, the large number of permutations of the 5 out of 9 items required for a diagnosis of an MDE yield quite different symptom profiles, which may be manifestations of different etiologies or pathophysiological processes responding to different treatment approaches. 25, 37 Finally, many patients have clinically significant presentations that do not fit into any of the specific DSM-IV categories, requiring the use of the catch-all NOS category. For some diagnostic classes, such as eating disorders, 38 BDs, 39 and PDs, 40 the NOS category is used more often than any of the specific categories.
DSM-5 Research Planning Phase I: Development of a Research Agenda
These myriad identified problems have sparked aspirations to abandon the DSM-IV descriptive approach and to replace it with a diagnostic system that would embody some sort of a paradigm shift. Consequently, in 1999, 5 years after the publication of DSM-IV, the APA initiated a DSM-5 research planning process, under the joint sponsorship of the NIMH, to focus on establishing a research agenda that would lay the groundwork for DSM to move beyond a descriptive approach. Indeed, an explicit goal of the DSM-5 research agenda was "to transcend the limitations of the current DSM paradigm and to encourage a research agenda that goes beyond our current ways of thinking" 41, p xix with the ultimate goal of adopting an "etiologically and pathophysiologicallybased diagnostic system." 32, p 35 Experts in diverse areas, such as family and twin studies, molecular genetics, basic and clinical neuroscience, cognitive and behavioural science, development, lifespan issues, and disability, were invited to participate. 41 They were instructed to consider new and emerging data, to identify knowledge gaps, and to propose research agendas that would generate the data to fill those gaps.
Research planning workgroups were charged with the development of 6 white papers that covered various cross-cutting topics. These included:
1. a basic nomenclature workgroup to focus on a classification issues;
2. a neuroscience and genetics workgroup to focus on developing a research agenda to guide the development of a future pathophysiologically-based classification;
3. a developmental science workgroup to focus on the developmental aspects of disorders;
4. a gaps in the DSM-IV workgroup to focus on inadequacies in the classification of PDs and relational disorders;
5. a mental disorders and disability workgroup to focus on disentangling the concepts of symptom severity and disability; and 6. a culture and psychiatric diagnosis workgroup to consider cross-cultural issues in diagnosis and classification.
Although this agenda was developed in collaboration with NIMH, no funding incentives were available to encourage researchers to implement any of its suggestions. It was thus evident to most participants that the development of DSM-5 would have to rely almost exclusively on the extant literature and on secondary data analyses, and that the proposed research agenda was almost certain not to bear fruit until the preparation of DSM-6 or later.
The 6 white papers were published by the APA in a 2002 monograph entitled A Research Agenda for DSM-V. 42 By and large, the research reviews indicated the presence of significant gaps in the psychiatric knowledge base, immediately casting doubts about the likelihood of any kind of paradigm shift in DSM-5. For example, the "Neuroscience Research Agenda" 32 cautioned that "it will be years, and possibly decades, before a fully explicated etiologically and pathophysiologically-based classification system for psychiatry exists." p 33
Three additional white papers, focusing on diagnostic issues as they relate to gender, the geriatric population, and infants and young children were commissioned shortly after publication of the first edition of A Research Agenda for DSM-V. Workgroups were again formed and charged with conducting literature reviews that would serve as state-of-the-art source documents for DSM-5 and to develop research agendas for the future. 43 As with the first volume of A Research Agenda for DSM-V, considerable gaps in our knowledge base in these areas were identified. For example, as noted in the Gender white paper, "much more research is needed . . . to elucidate the complex relationship between gender and psychopathology. The field, as important as it is, in still surprisingly nascent." 44, p 3 Table 1) . These conferences were organized in collaboration with the World Health Organization and were co-funded by APA, NIMH, the National Institute of Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse, and the National Institute of Drug Abuse. Unlike the white papers in the first phase, which focused on general cross-cutting issues, these conferences, for the most part, focused on specific diagnostic topic areas. The primary goal of these conferences was to review the current literature in each area, identify gaps in the knowledge base, and make suggestions regarding future research efforts that might serve to close those gaps. A secondary goal was to promote international collaboration at the earliest stages of the DSM-5 development process, with the hope that having significant international participation from the outset might increase the likelihood of minimizing future differences between DSM-5 and ICD-11. The conferences were thus organized so that there was equal US and international participation in terms of chairs, attendees, and sites. Summaries of all 12 conferences are posted on the DSM-5 website 45 and, to date, monographs covering 8 of the 12 conferences have been published by the APA. 46 There were numerous themes common to the conference presentations. Most of the conferences included presentations that explored the possibility of incorporating genetics, neuroimaging, biological tests, biomarkers, or other objective test results into the diagnostic criteria for disorders in DSM-5. While numerous interesting findings were presented that unequivocally established significant differences between groups of people with a disorder and control subjects, in no case were there any objective findings that were sufficiently diagnostically sensitive and specific to be useful in making a psychiatric diagnosis.
DSM-5 Research Planning Phase II: Research Planning Conferences
Another cross-cutting theme concerned whether psychiatric disorders are best classified as dimensions or categories. DSM-IV and ICD-10 are both categorical classifications; that is, a person either has or does not have a particular diagnosis.
A categorical approach to diagnosis is used in medical classifications for several reasons. Classifying the world into categories is a fundamental characteristic of human mentation embodied in the nouns of everyday speech (for example, animals, plants, planets, and chemical elements). Further, clinical practice is characterized by numerous yes or no decisions; for example, whether or not to treat, and whether or not to hospitalize; a categorical approach to diagnosis facilitates such decision making. Moreover, it has traditionally been assumed that most medical diseases are discrete entities. Although psychiatrists in the past have assumed that mental disorders are likewise discrete entities, with the exception of only a few conditions (for example, Down syndrome, fragile X syndrome, Alzheimer disease, and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease) research evidence strongly suggests that psychiatric disorders do not have discrete boundaries between them or between them and normality. 24, 27, 54 For this reason, there has been great interest in exploring whether dimensional approaches can be introduced into DSM-5. Two of the research conferences explicitly centred around the issue of dimensionality: one focused on developing the research base for implementing a dimensional model of PD in DSM-5 53 and another was devoted exclusively to the task of exploring the viability of dimensional alternatives across the different diagnostic classes. 49 Most of the other diagnosis-specific conferences included at least one presentation addressing whether a disorder is best characterized as dimensional or categorical-for example, the Substance-Related Disorders Conference included a presentation entitled "Should Substance Use Disorders Be Considered Categorical or Dimensional?" 55 Several conferences focused on the best way to group disorders within the DSM and ICD. The Deconstructing Psychosis Conference questioned the Kraepelinian boundary between schizophrenia and BD, raising the question of whether these 2 conditions, currently classified in 2 different sections of the classifications, are actually on a single continuum. 52 The Comorbidity of Depression and Generalized Anxiety Disorder Conference, in consideration of the substantial overlap of depression and anxiety in terms of genetic risk, antecedent temperament, treatment response, and comorbidity patterns, examined the relation of MDD and GAD, and recommended that, while these 2 disorders are distinct, they are nonetheless closely related and should be classified within the same superordinate diagnostic grouping. A third conference was entirely devoted to considering the viability of creating a new obsessive-compulsive spectrum grouping in DSM-5. This conference examined which disorders in the DSM-IV besides OCD might be considered for inclusion this grouping based on phenomenology, comorbidity, course of illness, treatment response, genetics, neuroimaging, and other validators. 56
DSM-5 Development Process
The Although the intent is for DSM-5 recommendations to be "grounded in empirical evidence," 58, p 5 it appears, at least compared with the DSM-IV process, that much less attention is being paid to the methodological rigour and comprehensiveness of the DSM-5 empirical review-no guidelines or standardized methodology were provided to the DSM-5 Workgroups regarding the conduct of the literature reviews.
Although the DSM-IV emphasis on a methodologically sound empirical review was a direct response to identified flaws in the DSM-III-R process (for example, requiring literature reviews to be critiqued by a wide range of advisers to insure lack of bias), the rationale for scaling back these procedures in DSM-5 is unclear, given the ongoing risk of a methodologically flawed and biased empirical review process.
In a significant departure from prior DSM revision efforts, in which the focus was limited to the provision of diagnostic criteria and descriptive text, much of the DSM-5 effort is focused on assessment and measurement issues. A DSM-5 study group has been established to work with the other workgroups to facilitate a bottom-up approach for instrument development that will . . . determine how relevant Indeed, Regier et al 57 noted that "one, if not the major difference between DSM-IV and DSM-V will be the more prominent use of dimensional measures in DSM-V." p 649 Accordingly, dimensional severity assessments are being proposed by the workgroups for each disorder in DSM-5. Moreover, numerous cross-cutting dimensional assessments that apply to many disorders are also being proposed (for example, a dimensional rating of current concern about potential suicidal behaviour). Prior efforts by the APA to facilitate measurement-based care have been limited to educating clinicians about the large number of available clinically useful measures in the context of its Handbook of Psychiatric Measures (now in its second edition). 59 Because the appropriateness of any given measure depends on numerous factors, including a consideration of specific cultural, ethnic, gender, social, and age factors, the Handbook avoided stipulating the use of any specific measure, instead encouraging clinicians to choose the measure most suitable for their particular clinical situation.
Although it is almost certainly true that clinicians think in terms both of categories (Does this patient have MDD?) and of dimensions (How severe is the depression?) when evaluating their patients, it does not necessarily follow that clinicians would find a system that prescribes the use of specific measures and requires them to record these dimensions in medical charts to be worth their time and effort. DSM-IV includes 2 dimensional components as part of its diagnostic system: the severity specifiers of mild, moderate, and severe, which are recommended to be applied to every disorder in the manual and the 100-point GAF scale, which is included as Axis V in the DSM-IV mulitaxial system. Despite their relative simplicity and ease-of-use, with the exception of the codable severity specifiers for current MDE and manic episode, the DSM-IV severity specifiers are largely ignored by clinicians, and the GAF scale is routinely used only in situations where its use is required, such as in mental health treatment settings within the Veterans Administration health care system. Indeed, the Assembly of the APA membership in 2004 passed an action paper calling for the elimination of the multiaxial system (including the GAF), noting that "there is no evidence that most practitioners make use of it when they are free not to." 60, p 2 Moreover, numerous concerns have been raised about whether clinicians would find a dimensional approach clinically useful. [61] [62] [63] [64] [65] Further, the decision by the DSM-5 Task Force to augment the categorical approach with add-on dimensions rather than doing away with categories altogether will do little to address high rates of NOS diagnoses and high levels of diagnostic comorbidity, both of which are the direct result of having adopted a categorical system of diagnosis. Finally, the provision of a host of dimensional measures in DSM-5 may lead to administrative bodies requiring that these measures be recorded in patients' charts to get reimbursed for services, increasing the already considerable administrative burden on clinicians.
For there to be any chance that the DSM-5 dimensions will fare better than their DSM-IV predecessors, significant efforts must be made to establish their reliability, sensitivity to change, and clinical utility. Fundamental to this effort is the provision of empirical evidence establishing not only that clinicians find such measures feasible or acceptable but also that the use of such measures improves clinical outcomes.
Otherwise it is unlikely that clinicians will be motivated to spend the time and effort required to put the measures into routine clinical use.
Moving Forward
Despite hopes that DSM-5 may be able to move beyond its current descriptive categorical paradigm as a result of the fruits of the past 16 years of scientific research, based on A Research Agenda for DSM-V, the DSM-5 research planning conference presentations, and the initial drafts of the DSM-5 proposals, it seems evident that DSM-5 will continue to follow the DSM-IV paradigm, namely, a descriptive categorical system augmented by dimensions. Any future paradigm shift will have to await significant advances in our understanding of the etiology and pathophysiology of mental disorders.
Concerns have recently been raised that the current DSM paradigm is impeding efforts toward gaining an understanding of the underlying pathophysiology of mental disorders. Hyman 66 cautions that . . . scientists attempting to discover genetic or neural underpinnings of disease have all too often reified the disorders listed in DSM-IV-TR as "natural kinds." . . . When investigators perform an imaging experiment, they recruit only patients with DSM-IV-TR schizophrenia or major depression . . . In reifying DSM-IV-TR diagnoses, one increases the risk that science will get stuck, and the very studies that are needed to define phenotypes are held back. p xix Similar concerns have been raised by the authors of the Neuroscience white paper, 32 which is part of A Research Agenda for DSM-V:
The over-reification of the DSM categories has led to a form of closed-mindedness on the part of researchers and funding sources. For example, researchers involved in new drug development tend to focus their efforts on treatment of DSM-IV-defined categories, despite widespread evidence that pharmacologic treatments tend to be effective in treating a relatively wide range of DSM disorders. Furthermore, the erroneous notion that the DSM categories can double as phenotypes may be partly responsible for the lack of success in discovering robust genetic markers. p 34 This problem stems in large part from the divergent and potentially incompatible needs of the clinical and research communities regarding a psychiatric nosology. As noted by Maser and Patterson, 67 researchers require a nosology that helps them to discover replicable facts and mechanisms regarding the description, etiology, and treatment of mental disorders . . . Clinicians want a nosology that accurately and simply defines a diagnosis. p 855
One solution is to uncouple the clinical and research applications of the psychiatric nosology by having different versions for clinician and research use. DSM already has a mechanism for offering the research community alternative diagnostic constructs, namely, its research appendix for "Categories and Axes Needing Further Study," which could be greatly expanded in DSM-5. 68 Another approach is to develop a completely new classification for research use, such as has been proposed by the NIMH in their strategic initiative. 69 This initiative, the Research Domain Categories project (commonly referred to as RDoCs), proposes the creation of diagnostic categories based on fundamental behavioural components (for example, executive functioning and affect regulation) that may be more closely related to underlying neurobiological systems than are the current descriptive syndromes presented in the DSM. Either way, it appears that the DSM tradition of having a single classification for both clinical and research use may no longer be sustainable for the future.
